‘Nationalists’ Resistance And Colonial Reaction In Malaya, 1946-48

Abstract

This article discusses the anti-colonial resistance and British reaction between 1946 and 1948, a critical period in the history of Malaya beginning with the formation of Malayan Union to the declaration of Emergency. The main objective of this study is to elucidate in detail the position and actions of Malay nationalists that came into response to the various re-colonisation policies by the British after World War II, and the counter-measures taken by the British to weaken Malay nationalism and eliminate their resistance to maintain colonial rule in Malaya. This study used qualitative research methods supported by British official documents and the relevant secondary sources. This study shows how the British manipulated the ideological dichotomy inherent in various nationalist movements and accentuated the bipolarity between - Malay/non-Malay, elite/non-elite, right/left, nationalist/communist groups - to create wide chasms and in the process weaken their efforts to seek independence in Malaya. The British also utilised biased historical interpretations and political propaganda to fabricate a negative image of these groups. Communist aggression, for instance, was used widely to justify the intensity of British actions, including their move to declare Malayan Emergency in 1948 to pressurise nationalist movements in Malaya.

Keywords: British colonialismEmergencyMalay nationalismUMNOMalay leftcommunism

Introduction

The Second World War (WWII) ended in 1945 really had changed the political landscape of many nations in the world, in particular, British colonies in the ‘Third World’. For the first time in history, British imperialism was challenged by nation considered as weak like Germany and Japan. During the war, Britain’s position weakened substantially, while countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union gained prominence. With the political attitudes of US in maintaining its strong ‘anti-empire’ policy made it difficult for Britain to sustain its empire and the expansion of Soviet Union also became a problem to Britain’s position in Southeast Asia. But the British were scared of one thing, the strength of anti-colonial nationalist movements which grew rapidly after WWII. With the growing number of anti-colonial movements and their quest for independence catalysed by global developments, it could no longer be restrained any further. All the events happen in India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Burma, for example, catalysed nationalism (find different words for this) in Malaya. Hence, the anxiety of losing Malaya - a strategically important and resource-rich colony - led the British to adopt a tough stance to settle this problem.

Before launching any full-fledged ‘colonial war’, the British already adopted several other strategies like weakening the opposition by accentuating the ethnic and ideological differences of nationalist movements to create disunity among them. Another strategy was to use negative propaganda in creating an image that the nationalist movements in Malaya were actually subversive elements. Framing the nationalist groups based on narrow ethnic interests and/or influenced by subversive and communist agents were the main strategies made by the British in making sure that these movements remained unrecognised as legitimate nationalist groups. Since the communist movements such as the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) allegedly trying to achieve their political goals through violence, these local nationalist movements that were labelled as communist groups were also accused of being made up of subversive and terrorist elements.

Thus, this study will discuss how the British officials took advantage of the differences (real or imaginary) between the anti-colonial movement in Malaya, namely Malays/non-Malays, elite/non-elites, right/left and nationalists/communists in the 1940s, to create a deep chasm in their political struggle. This study also elucidates how British officials used political propaganda in their official reports to undermine the nationalist movements by accusing them of being communist agents, terrorists, and trouble-makers. By accusing them of being involved in subversive, terrorist and communist activities and planning to launch an armed revolt via the MCP (with the support of the Soviet Union), the British were able to justify its decision to declare a state of Emergency in Malaya in 1948 and in the process to eliminate the entire anti-colonial resistance.

Problem Statement

Although many studies have been conducted to elucidate the political development that taking place in Malaya in 1946-48, a gap still exists as historians have failed to connect the development taken place prior to or at least since 1946 until the declaration of Malayan Emergency in 1948. Historians often view the year 1946 as the climax of Malay nationalist consciousness and the failure of the British to face pressure particularly in the form of Malay resistance towards the Malayan Union. Many historians opined that after the British encountered strong opposition towards its plans, they had to “surrender” and rescind the Malayan Union plan. The plan was said to be abolished and replaced with the Federation of Malaya shows the success of the Malay resistance movement against the Malayan Union (Azmi, 2014). This opinion failed to perceive the 1946-57 as a successful period for the British in introducing the Malayan Union when the Emergency of 1948 constitutes a part of the steps undertaken by the British to realise their dreams. As a result of such an interpretation, analysts often viewed 1946 as a basis to weaken the hold of the British colonialists because the latter were forced to face strong resistance from the Malays through the right-wing political party (the United Malays National Organization or UMNO) and this success further accelerated their efforts towards achieving independence for Malaya. This opinion did not place a strong emphasis on the role of the Malay religious-left group in challenging the British and the effect on the attitude as well as the response of the British towards the Malay nationalist movement. The Malay religious-left group was considered as merely a minority group, deprived of Malay support and controlled by an extremely strong communist influence. This initial view was particularly held by local historians (Azmi, 2014).

The second tendency explains Malaya’s political struggle from 1946-48 as a communist resurgence era and the onset of the Cold War era in Southeast Asia (Deery, 2007), and here wide emphasis was placed on the role of MCP and the Malay religious-left which were regarded as being part of the communist element. As such, the only political movement considered capable of challenging the British in this period was the MCP (Furedi, 1994; Stockwell, 1993). The historians, particularly among Western scholars who have been discussing the political development from 1946-48, failed to regard the 1946-48 period as a period of confrontation between the colonial powers and local nationalists, comprising mainly the Malay religious-left group. Furthermore, the influence of the religious group was clearly marginalised since Roff’s writing (1967) reveals that the struggle of this group was mainly over religious issues, and some belief that the religious movement was also influenced by the communists. A glaring weakness found in the earlier view was that they failed to separate the religious-left movement and the communist movement to the extent that it conveniently concluded that the PKM, which was alleged to have controlled the Malay religious-left, was the strongest threat and much feared by the British during this period. It was then pointed out that the British response to the anti-colonial movement especially in 1948 was primarily on the communist threat.

Hence, this writing trying to illuminate the fear that the British faced towards the threat posed by the Malay nationalist movement, and it was not the communists inducing the British to declare Emergency in 1948, making MCP the ‘scapegoat’ to enable the British to justify their action towards the legitimate nationalist movement. In short, this study suggests that 1946-48 denotes a period of confrontation between nationalists-colonialists and not communist-colonialist. As such, this writing challenges the orthodox as well as the revisionist versions that were marshalled by some Western analysts from Furedi in the 1990s to Karl Hack and Philips Deery recently. Although Furedi (1990) also holds that the period of 1946-48 marked the conflict between the nationalist and colonialist, his main weakness was that he regarded the nationalist merely as part of the communist movement or the MCP.

Research Questions

What is the truth and reasons behind the British declaration of Emergency 1948 in Malay Peninsula?

Purpose of the Study

The main purpose of this study is to elucidate in detail the position and actions taken by the Malay nationalists in responding to the various re-colonisation policies made by the British after World War II, and the counter-measures taken by the British to weaken Malay nationalism and eliminate their threats to maintain their rule in Malaya.

Research Methods

Qualitative method is selected for this study to provide factual data needed to support all the explanations and views regarding the truth behind the declaration of Emergency 1948 in Malaya by the British. During data collection, several archival documents and manuscripts like the Colonial Office, the Cabinet Papers and other British documents and reports will be fully utilized in suiting the objective of this study. On every data collected, it will be analysed and a summary will be made to justify British actions, including their move to declare Malayan Emergency in 1948 to handle the nationalist movements in Malaya.

Findings

Although the British-UMNO alliance undertook many campaigns to weaken the left groups, the Malays support for the left-wing independence movements did not show any signs of retreating; in fact, it was actually gaining strength. This happen because there was a growing political awareness among the Malays, including those from UMNO after WWII.

Basically, the efforts taken to weaken these left and the right wing (pro-British) movements did not succeeded because of two factors. First, UMNO was having internal problems rose from political rivalry causing disunity within the party and also problems related to UMNO’s concessions to the British. For instance, there were ‘separatist’ movements in some Malay states who wanted to free themselves from the dominance of the central government as evidence in Kelantan, Kedah and Terengganu. Besides, the existence of ‘left’ groups within UMNO that wanted independence had taken a tough stance to defend Malay rights and resist British exploitation. Among them was the Kesatuan Melayu Johor (KMJ - renamed as Lembaga Kesatuan Melayu Johor, LKMJ) led by Dr Hamzah who often criticized and challenged Dato’ Onn and other leaders. He accused them of being British stooges who agreed to every British and non-Malay demand (Azmi, 2014, p. 16). Besides, there were major dissensions among the top UMNO leaders themselves, for instance between Dato’ Onn and Tunku Abdul Rahman from SABERKAS (a sub-organisation in UMNO). Tunku was vocal in his criticisms against Dato’ Onn’s political approach in UMNO. This was sparked by Dato’ Onn’s own actions, to agree on the concessions for the non-Malays as stipulated in the Federation of Malaya plan. He was also criticized because he had failed to demand a clear plan of action towards self-governance which eventually decrease people’s support for him. LKMJ which had been critical from the very beginning on Dato’ Onn’s leadership threatened to leave UMNO if their demands to overhaul UMNO’s policy and give greater importance to Malay rights and reject British manipulation was not met. As expected, without a positive response from him, LKMJ disassociated themselves from UMNO (Azmi, 2014, p. 16).

Secondly, the left wing activities were beginning to receive better support from lower class groups, including some UMNO members. Hence, it’s weakening influence and position was further aggravated increase support for the left especially PKMM. Left wing and religious activities began to garner support from the members of the lower class society, especially the activities of Hizbul Muslimin, an Islamic-Malay political organisation based in Gunung Semanggol, Perak (Nabir, 1976; Funston, 1980). Their activities were participated by many UMNO members despite numerous warnings from Dato’ Onn (Nabir, 1976: p. 197; CO 537/3751). The dissolution of several UMNO branches and the conversion of some Persatuan Melayu Johor (PMJ) to PKMM was a concrete proof on the changes of support among the Malays. This situation did not only made Dato’ Onn feel restlessness but to the British as well. British intelligence reports from April to May 1948 stated that left-wing activities were beginning to receive fervent support, while UMNO was ‘…steadily losing ground to left-wing organisations…’ and its leadership open to ‘…attack by left-wing propaganda’ (MSS 1948; CO 537/3751).

The resurgence of religious movements that became an ally to the Malay left and non-Malays alsp became a great challenge to UMNO and the British. Like the Majlis Agama Tertinggi (MATA) and Hizbul Muslimin under Ustaz Abu Bakar al-Baqir began to gain strong support from the Malays as they were active to fight for the welfare of the Malays, for example in education and economy. Hizbul Muslimin also organised rallies, involving left political movements including PKMM, Angkatan Wanita Sedar (AWAS), and Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API), other non-Malay left parties such as the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) and even representatives from the MCP in fight for Malaya independence. Religious organisations and the Malay left groups that opposed the British-UMNO’s Federation of Malaya formed alliances with the non-Malay bodies giving birth to the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action (PMCJA)-Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (PUTERA) alliance in February 1947 (CO 537/2148).

Although been accused as radical, the AMCJA-PUTERA alliance maintained moderation in their political agitation by officially sending their suggestions and protests to the British government. However, their voices and demands were completely ignored. The British only accept meeting with UMNO and reject other parties’ requests causing those nationalist movements to take stronger measures to pressure the British. On 20 October 1947, AMCJA-PUTERA launched an initiative known as ‘hartal’ to force the British to listen to their voices and fulfil their demands (Stockwell 1984, p. 94). Meanwhile, there were also violent protests by trade unions activists believed to have been instigated by communist elements, particularly by members of the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Union (PMFTU). These developments were considered as evidence of radicalism among members of the working class who resorted to violence to pressure the British who had imposed various kinds of restrictions to curb union activities that were provocative. British authorities who realised the growing influence and threat of the pro-independence left and religion-based nationalists took the opportunity from the unrest, created by union activists to launch a concerted effort to weaken the entire anti-colonial resistance movements and in the process fortify UMNO. Among the initial measures taken by the British was to ban several groups that were labelled as ‘radical’ such as API and Ahmad Boestamam, the leader was arrested (CO 537/2151). In addition, PMFTU was banned and the union leaders accused of being controlled by MCP were arrested for being too radical. With the murder of three European estate owners in Sungei Siput on 16 June 1948 by the communists and labour union activists, the British declared a state of Emergency within Malay Peninsula on 18 June 1948 and wipe out all traces of anti-colonialism in Malaya.

Conclusion

This writing had thoroughly discussed how the British authorities succeeded in manipulating the ideological and racial difference inherent in nationalist movements in Malaya to create disunity among the groups. By accentuating the bipolar divisions namely pro-British/anti-British nationalists and Malay/non-Malay nationalists, they succeeded in disuniting and weakening those movements while using pro-British groups as their allies to give an impression to the rest of the world that there were no demands for independence in Malaya after WWII. The main strategy used by the British to restrain the growth of pro-independence nationalist groups was to prevent the Malays from supporting these groups. Hence, the British not only made use of UMNO as their stooge but also made use of MCP as a scapegoat in their effort to divert the Malays from the political movements of the Malay left and religious groups.

With the growing political awareness and strong desire to free the country from the colonists, it contributed to the increase Malay support since the mid-1940s. As UMNO which did not show any interest in seeking independence, they gradually lose their influence. In fact, some of its members and organisations within UMNO began to turn their support to PKMM. By manipulating the facts and branding the violent actions as part of ‘an international communist conspiracy that intended to topple the government through an armed revolt’, the British declared nationwide state of Emergency in Malaya on 18 Jun 1948. This declaration did not only succeed in weakening the entire anti-colonial movement, but even managed to diminish the magnitude of the anti-colonial struggle in Malaya and frame it as a narrow ethnic-based struggle between MCP, its supporters and the Chinese on one side and the British, UMNO and the Malays on the other. The dismantling of unity among anti-colonial movements and the destruction of the Malay left and religious organisations, as a result of Emergency enabled the British to fully eradicate the threat from anti-colonial nationalists till the declaration of independence in 1957.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to sincerely thank Universiti Sains Malaysia for funding this research through the research university grant (1001/PHUMANITI/816232).

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