Author’s Concept of Theoretical Justification Areas of Counter-terrorism. Economical based Logical-mathematical Models

Abstract

In this article, the authors examine how to use logical and mathematical models (by the example of the balance model and the two-factor Altman’s model), to estimate the potential of a terrorist threat that is determined as a complex concept which reflects the state of terror among the various microenvironment and macroenvironment levels. These levels are obtained by extrapolating the existing economic methods for the purposes of theoretical justification of counter-terrorism areas.The article is recommended for social engineers in order to developcounter-terrorism’s ways. The purpose of this study is to present the author's concept of identifying areas to prevent the terrorist threat based on the extrapolation of existing economic models. To achieve this purpose, the following tasks were accomplished: 1) present the authors' definition of potential terrorist threats; 2) form balance models of the terrorist threat of the medium micro and macro level; 3) demonstrate the way of using these balance models, where the informational basis is to assess the potential terrorist threat and study areas of counter-terrorism. The following general scientific methods of study were used: analysis, synthesis, comparison, generalization. And also, specific methods of economic analysis: balance generalization, methods of rating evaluation, methods of complex probability assessment of the insolvency of the study subject. The obtained results can be used by the executive authorities and law enforcement agencies for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism.

Keywords: Terrorismpotential of terrorist threatBalance modelterrorist environment comprehensive analysisEconomic models

Introduction

The urgency of the struggle against the terrorist threat in the world today is an important factor in the development of a socio-political process. The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the XXI century was marked by an active struggle against illegal gang formations on the territory of a number of states, such as: Syria, Iraq, Libya, North Caucasian regions of Russia, etc. The consequence of which was and is the realization of terrorist aggression in the regions of the anti-terrorist operations, and beyond.

According to the current legislation of the Russian Federation, terrorism – the ideology of violence and the practice of influencing the decision-making bodies of the government, local authorities or international organizations related to the intimidation of the population and (or) other forms of illegal acts of violence.

Thus, terrorism has been and remains the most significant threat to national security and social stability of the area.

Applications of evaluation of a terrorist threat have used many different methods and approaches. Examples of methods that have been applied include gender aspects (Holman1, 2016), risk models (Willis, 2008; Zafar, 2016) agent-based models (N-ABLE, 2006; Tsvetovat & Carley, 2002), game theory (Kunreuther, 2005; Bier et al., 2005), economic input-output models (Haimes et al., 2005; Gordon et al., 2007), probabilistic risk analysis (Rosoff, & von Winterfeldt, 2006; ASME, 2007), operations research approaches, drawing upon queuing theory and decision analysis (Martonosi et al., 2005; Wein et al., 2006), and probabilistic models developed and used in the insurance industry (Willis et al., 2005; Willis, 2007; Carroll et al., 2005; Doherty et al., 2005).

But nevertheless,there is no accepted methods to evaluate a terrorist threat, therefore authors developed their own concept, based on extrapolated logical-mathematical models that are used all over the world in the field of economy.

Methods

Based on the broad diversification of the causes of terrorist aggression, deep secrecy terrorist networks and the international nature of the threat, the struggle against terrorism requires significant manpower, material and time costs. In this regard, the question,concerning the forming of the principles of justification of the most effective areas of the fight against terrorism,remains. For a description of these principles, it is first necessary to formulate the main factors influencing the potential terrorist threat. At the same time, a potential terrorist threat is a probability of terrorist attacks in a certain area in a certain period of time.

Potential of terrorist threat is a complex concept which reflects the state of terror among the various levels:

-microenvironment – the level of the individual artist or territorial cells;

-macroenvironment – the level of individual state and interstate cooperation.

In order to most accurately take into account the factors that influence the potential terrorist threat (regardless of the medium scale),these factorsmust be more detailed and based on the characteristics of forming a terrorist environment of each particular level. This is important not only for property state of the environment, but also for the sources of its formation. According to authors, the most visible form of environment representation at any level is the appropriate balance model.

Microenvironment. The balance model of terrorist microenvironment can be represented as follows (the authors’ view) (Table 1 ).

We will characterize the basic components of the balance model of terrorist microenvironment shown in Table 1 .

The Intangible assets characterize the theoretical readiness of a particular person to commit a terrorist act:

-ideology is a system of values and judgments;

-professional skills are the level of trainings that is necessary and sufficient to carry out a terrorist act.

The Tangible assets reflect a list of property (assets) and an organizational structure to ensure the actual implementation of the crime.

The sources of assets formation are as follows:

-the ideological commitment is a motivator formed from the existing system of values and judgments;

-personal motivation is a motivator formed by means of the existing subjective reasons (personal animosity, revenge, blackmail, profit, health and so forth);

-target financing - the main source of the creation of tangible assets.

Macroenvironment. The balance model of terrorist macroenvironment can be represented as follows (the author's view) (Table. 2 ).

We will characterize the basic components of the balance model of terrorist macroenvironment shown in Table 2 .

The System forming assets are the basis for providing main tasks of micro- and macroenvirenment: social, economic and political centre functions.Such assets are characterized by a long useful life and are the basis for the formulation of strategic decisions. The System forming assets section is divided into two components: the intangible and tangible assets. The main characteristic of intangible assets is the lack of the material form.In spite of this, their value for a given level of the terrorist environment is decisive. Tangible assets are a tangible form and the appropriate response.

The Current assets reflect the property of the micro- and macroenvironment. This property is characterized by a constant changing of materials in dynamic.

The System forming liabilities are aimed for information categories, reflecting the fundamental liabilities, the main reasons, inducing the formation and maintenance of the existing terrorist environment.

The Long-term liabilities and Short-term liabilities reflect the size of the environment’s debts to the external and internal borrowing. External liabilities represent the amount of debt owed to non-residents of the state, internal – to residents, both in fact and in other case, the creditors may make individuals, legal persons and other states.

Further, we consider a number of models to prove the most effective (according to the authors’ hypothesis) directions of counter-terrorism.

Rating evaluation

This model is based on the calculation and subsequent analysis of the outcome of the rating on the basis of the data of balance models terrorist micro- and macroenvironment.

The order of the rating: the first and the second phases are qualitative and quantitative assessment of indicators of assets and liabilities in the balance models are appropriately reflected in the description of the balance model.

In the third phase, it is necessary to form a system of key performance indicatorsfor each level of the terrorist environment.

At the same time, forming the system of key performance, indicators should be guided as follows:

1. Indicators in the system and their target values should not contradict each other.

2. Prohibition of quantitative overload interdependent parameters of the system (at least at the maximum analytical performance information).

3. Indicators must be essential to the full (comprehensive) assessment of the terrorist environment appropriate level.

4. Forming a system of indicators should consider the peculiarities of the most appropriate level of environmental terrorism.

5. Indicators should have a relative view.

6. Indicators should be approximately equal for the purposes of a comprehensive assessment of the overall terrorist environment.

Specific indicators are formed and calculated on the basis of statistical and factual data about the terrorist environment.

In the fourth phase, the values of the coefficients of the balanced scorecard should be consolidated by calculating the number of rating and assign an appropriate rating for each of the levels of terrorist environment.

The considered method of determining the ranking of the terrorist environment (regardless of level), that is based on the balance model, means a one-time existence of the following requirements:

- the allocation of the five classes of reliability;

- the allocation of six rating groups.

At the same time, the following settings will be guided in determining the grade of reliability:

- if the key indicator in the first grade reliability – it is given 5 points;

- if the key indicator is in the second grade reliability – it is given 4 points;

- if the key indicator in the third grade of reliability – 3 points;

- if the key indicator is in the fourth grade reliability – 2 points;

- if the key indicator in the fifth grade reliability – 1 point.

The criteria for the high potential of the terrorist threat is the greatest amount of points for key indicators.

Moreover, rating groups formed by the degree of the potential terrorist threat will meet forth above in description of the balance model.

In the fifth phase, the current potential of terrorist threatsis being estimated and measures are being developed for its reduction on the basis of the actual rating. The emphasis should be on a reducing the quality of key performance indicators presented in the system. Targeting efforts in this case will not only reduce the funds but also to catalyse the achievement of the priorities in the field of reducing the terrorist threat.

In order to form judgments about the integral territory of the terrorist environment (microenvironment and macroenvironment), the authors believe it is advisable to use a graphical method by constructing an appropriate graph.

To do this it is advisable to build a coordinate system in which the horizontal axis will reflect the rating group of the microenvironment, the vertical axis is a rating group of the macroenvironment. Then the current state of the terrorist complex environment can be represented as follows (see the conventional example in the Figure 1 ).

See Full Size >

Results

Thus, in this publication the authors proposed procedure for the use of logical and mathematical models to estimate the potential of terrorist threat, obtained by extrapolating the existing economic methods for the purposes of theoretical justification areas of counter-terrorism.

During the preparation of this article the following interim results were obtained:

1) present the authors’ definition of potentialof terrorist threats, that is determined as a complex concept which reflects the state of terror among the various microenvironment andmacroenvironment levels;

2) develop balance models of terrorist medium micro and macro level. Balance model of the terrorist microenvironment is determined by the Intangible assets, that characterise the theoretical readiness of a particular person to commit a terrorist act.The tangible assets reflect list of property (assets) and anorganizational structure to ensure the actual implementation of the crime and appropriate liabilities. Balance model of the terrorist macroenvironment is determined by the System forming assets, which are the basis for the main tasks of the environment. The System forming assets are divided into two components: the intangible and tangible assets. The main characteristic of intangible assets is the lack of material form, in spite of this, their value for a given level of the terrorist environment is decisive. Tangible assets are in tangible form and have the appropriate response. The Current assets reflect the property of the micro- and macroenvironment. This property is characterized by a constant changing of materials in dynamic.

The System forming liabilities are aimed for information categories, reflecting the fundamental liabilities, the main reasons, inducing the formation and maintenance of the existing terrorist environment.The Long-term liabilities and Short-term liabilities reflect the size of the environment’s debts to the external and internal borrowing. External liabilities represent the amount of debt owed to non-residents of the state, internal – to residents, both in fact and in another case, the creditors may make individuals, legal persons and other states.

3) it is revealed that these balance models can be the informational basis to assess the potential terrorist threat and study areas of counter-terrorism.

Conclusion

The obtained results can be used by the executive authorities and law enforcement agencies for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism through targeted influence on the most significant factors in the formation of the terrorist environment of micro- and macrolevels.

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